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INTRODUCTION
On 2 September 2011, Professor Dubner received an e-mail from a
gentleman by the name of Andrew Mwangura which was sent from
Mombasa, Kenya. This same gentleman, and between 20 and 25 people,
including Professor Dubner, were invited to the Harvard’s Kennedy School
of Government under the auspices of the World Peace Foundation and the
Cambridge Coalition to Combat Piracy (December 2009) in order to express
views on how to resolve piracy off the coast of Somalia. Included in this
group were scholars, diplomats, senior ranking military officers, intelligence
representatives, shipping industry officials, and other experts on maritime
piracy. They came from all over the world to attend this important meeting
They met in a conference room in the Harvard Kennedy Center and
discussed the situation for two and a half days. The results of these sessions
became embodied in an article called “Combating Maritime Piracy: A
Policy Brief with Recommendations for Actions.”1 Since that meeting and
resulting policy brief, there have been numerous articles and studies by the
United Nations’ maritime-economists. Most recently, the United Nations
(U.N.) issued a Report of the Secretary-General on the Modalities for the
a1. Barry Hart Dubner, Professor of Law, Barry University, Andreas School of
Law, Orlando, Florida; J.D., New York Law School; LL.M., University of Miami, School of
Law; LL.M., New York University School of Law; J.S.D., New York University School of
Law. Ritvik Raturi, B.Sc., University of Toronto; J.D. Barry University, Andreas School of
Law.
1. ROBERT I. ROTBERG, COMBATING MARITIME PIRACY: A POLICY BRIEF
WITH RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTIONS, WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION, POLICY
BRIEF #11 (World Peace Found. 2010), available at http://www.somalilandtimes.net/sl/

2010/418/WPF_Piracy_PolicyBrief_11.pdf.
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Establishment of Specialized Somali Anti-Piracy Courts (hereinafter,
Modalities Report).2
Perhaps the most interesting statement on the current state of piracy does
not come from U.N. documents and other articles, but from the
aforementioned email that was received from Mr. Mwangura.3 He posed a
series of questions and requested assistance in obtaining certain data on
Somali sea piracy occurrences from September 2010 to August 2011. The
request he posed is quite telling (see Appendix A). The questions
demonstrate how the crime of piracy has expanded from the simple stealing
of petty fund boxes and safes on board ships to the kidnapping of human
beings and the hijacking of ships. The questions show that, even without the
answers, exactly how bad the situation has become with regard to sea piracy
committed in both near and far from the 1800 mile coast off of Somalia.
The answers to these questions can be found in many sources, including
the United States Government Counter-Piracy Steering Group, the Contact
Group on Piracy, and their five working groups and the International
Maritime Bureau.4 The reason for asking these questions was never given
but it is obvious that the simple crime of piracy has now become rather a
2. U.N. Secretary-General, The Modalities for the Establishment of Specialized
Somali Anti-Piracy Courts: Rep. of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2011/360 (June 15,
2011), available at http://unpos.unmissions.org/Portals/UNPOS/Repository%20UNPOS/S2011-360%20%2815Jun2011%29%20Piracy.pdf [hereinafter The Modalities].
3. See infra App. A.
4. See Counter Piracy and Maritime Security (PM/CPMS), U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/piracy/c32662.htm (“The U.S. Government Counter-Piracy
Steering Group is an “executive-level body created to implement the National Action and
Partnership Plan to Combat Piracy off the Horn of Africa, this group is co-chaired by the
Departments of State and Defense and reports to the National Security Staff. Also
represented on this group are the Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, Treasury,
Transportation, and the U.S. Agency for International Development.”); see Background,
CONTACT
GROUP
ON
PIRACY
OFF
THE
COAST
OF
SOMALIA,
http://www.thecgpcs.org/about.do?action=background (last visited Feb. 12, 2012) (“Pursuant
to UN Security Council Resolution 1851, the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of
Somalia (CGPCS) was established on January 14, 2009 to facilitate the discussion and
coordination of actions among states and organizations to suppress piracy off the coast of
Somalia. This international forum has brought together more than 60 countries and
international organizations all working towards the prevention of piracy off the Somali
coast.”); see International Maritime Bureau, ICC COMMERCIAL CRIME SERVICES, http://iccccs.org/home/imb (last visited Feb. 14, 2012) (“The International Maritime Bureau [(IMB)]
is a specialized division of the International Chamber [o]f Commerce [(ICC)]” that was
“established in 1981 to act as a focal point in the fight against all types of maritime crime and
malpractice.”). Since 1992, the IMB has operated its Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC), the
main objective of which ”is to be the first point of contact for the shipmaster to report” an
actual or attempted attack or even suspicious movements, “thus initiating the process of
response.” IMB Piracy Reporting Centre, ICC COMMERCIAL CRIME SERVICES, http://iccccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre (last visited Feb. 14, 2012). The PRC’s “main aim” is to
“raise awareness within the shipping industry, which includes the shipmaster, ship-owner,
insurance companies, traders, etc[.], of the areas of high risk associated with piratical attacks
or specific ports and anchorages associated with armed robberies on board ships.” Id.
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strain economically on maritime shipping companies and countries, such as
the United States and European Union. The purpose of this article is to
show how and why there is a “cottage” industry developing to both prevent
and fight piracy. Mr. Mwangura ends his e-mail as follows: “Everyone is
crying out for peace, none of them is crying for justice. We want equal
rights and justice.” (See Appendix A). The assumption is that this refers to
the seamen and other civilian hostages that are being held over long periods
of time. The waste of human life is appalling. The economics of the
situation is one of the main causes of sea piracy.
I.

THE EXTENT OF THE SEA PIRACY PROBLEM

One of the key questions asked in Mr. Mwangura’s email was whether or
not the prosecution of pirates had any effect. The answer lies partly with the
economics involved. When reading the statistics, sea piracy seems to be
getting worse, not better. For example, as of March 2011, Contact Group on
Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) Plenary Session reported that
pirates were holding 26 ships and 573 hostages; in July 2011, CGPCS
Plenary Session reported 17 ships and 393 hostages; and in November 2011,
CGPCS Plenary Session reported 10 ships and 243 hostages.5 These reports
show that there is a continuing trend of pirates capturing fewer ships (“IMB
credits the reduction in hijackings to the intervention by international naval
forces.”).6 However, in contrast to the trend of fewer hijackings is the fact
that piracy is a growing threat because the number of pirate attacks
continues to be on the rise, “albeit with a decreasing rate of success.”7 In
July 2011, the IMB released a report stating that pirates are now targeting
areas frequented by crude oil tankers.8 Furthermore, “Ships, including oil
and chemical tankers, are increasingly being attacked with automatic
weapons and rocket-propelled grenade launchers. Whereas five years ago
5. See also Contact Group of Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, Communiqué: Ninth
Plenary Session of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, N.Y., July 14,
2011, available at http://www.thecgpcs.org/plenary.do?action=plenarySub&seq=18 (follow
“Communique from 9th Session” hyperlink) [hereinafter ninth Plenary Session]; Contact
Group of Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, Communiqué: Tenth Plenary Session of the
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, N.Y., Nov. 17, 2011, available at
http://www.thecgpcs.org/plenary.do?action=plenarySub&seq=19 (follow “Communique
from 10th Session” hyperlink) [hereinafter Tenth Plenary Session].
6. See Ninth Plenary Session, supra note 5, at 1. See also As World Piracy Hits a
New High, More Ships are Escaping Somali Pirates, Says IMB Report, INT’L MAR. BUREAU
(Oct. 18, 2011), http://www.icc-ccs.org/news/969-as-world-piracy-hits-a-new-high-moreships-are-escaping-somali-pirates-says-imb-r.
7. Tenth Plenary Session, supra note 5, at 1.
8. Pirate Attacks at Sea Getting Bigger and Bolder, Says IMB Report, INT’L
MAR. BUREAU (July 14, 2011), http://www.icc-ccs.org/news/450-pirate-attacks-at-seagetting-bigger-and-bolder-says-imb-report.International Maritime Bureau (IMB) 2011
figures show that Somali pirates this year have initiated more attacks, 231 this year, up from
126 for the first nine months of 2010. Id.
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pirates were just as likely to brandish a knife as a gun, this year guns were
used in 160 attacks and knives in 35.”9 Owners of oil and energy tankers are
also claiming that insider information is allowing pirates to target their
ships.10
“The geographical area of the attacks now stretches to 2.8 million square
miles, an area that is increasingly difficult for naval forces to patrol.”11 In
addition, according to the Modalities Report, the expanding range of attacks
has been achieved through the use of mother ships.12 The Modalities Report
stated that Pirates are now
[u]sing large vessels with supplies for smaller pirate vessels used in
attacks, and with as many as a hundred pirates on board to guard
hostages and to deter rescue attempts. Pirate attacks now often involve
the use of overwhelming force to overcome security personnel on board
merchant ships. Hijacked crews have been used as “human shields”
against military intervention, and have been threatened as a means to
deter military attack.13

It is estimated that there are about “50 main pirate leaders, around 300
leaders of pirate attack groups, and aground 2,500 ‘foot soldiers.’ It is
believed that financing is provided by [approximately] 10 to 20 individuals.
In addition, there is a large number of armed individuals guarding captured
ships, and numerous ransom negotiators” working for the pirates.14
Against this background, this essay will explore the “classical” period of
piracy to see how much difference there is between the operations of pirates
centuries ago, in the Caribbean, for example, and operations that are being
used today off of Somalia. It will be observed that everything has changed
and nothing has changed meaning that though there are numerous new
tactics used by pirates and their backers, the laws regarding piracy are
essentially the same now as they were centuries ago; the prosecution of
pirates and trying to create a prosecutorial system in a lawless country has
become problematic, just as it was centuries ago; and the approach to the
problem of sea piracy has been one of repeating past mistakes. This article
will demonstrate that all of the economic and prosecutorial problems that
exist today also existed hundreds of years ago.
The resurgence of piracy is obviously due to the fact that it has become a
financial success for the pirates and their backers. Now most of the
countries are waiting to see what is going to happen to the relationship
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Walter Menya, Kenya: Nation’s Neighbours Reluctant to Host Courts to Try
Somali Pirates, ALL AFRICA (July 9, 2011), http://allafrica.com/stories/201107111497.html.
12. The Modalities, supra note 2, at 27.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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between pirates and the various extremist groups in Somalia. Can the
relationship of extremists and organized crime syndicates with pirates
become so successful that nobody in the country of Somalia will be able to
stop it? Will piracy develop in the same manner as the South American drug
trade in the 1970s, a relatively small-time operation turning into a huge
global crisis? These are some of the questions that this article is going to
explore.
This discussion will commence with a look at some of the highlights of
piracy that existed centuries ago.
II. THE CLASSICAL PERIOD OF PIRACY
When Professor Dubner became interested in writing about piracy it was
because he had thought that the crime had disappeared from the face of the
earth. He wrote the first book on International Law of Sea Piracy over 30
years ago.15 At that time, the main source of material was a 1932 study by
the Harvard Research Group.16 The group proposed draft articles on the
subject of sea piracy and concluded that they were going to prepare the draft
articles (later adopted in the 1958 Geneva Convention and the 1982 United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)) in an expeditious
manner, because the crime itself had long ago been forgotten and was
insignificant.17
The classical or “golden age” of piracy, when pirates were at their
strongest and sea piracy was at its height, extended from the 1660s to the
1730s.18 According to Defoe, “[t]his was at a Time that the Pyrates had
obtained such an Acquisition of Strength, that they were in no concern
about preserving themselves from the Justice of Laws.”19 Everybody has
heard about Blackbeard (his real name being Edward Teach or possibly
“Tech,” etc.), Bartholomew Roberts and others. One of the most interesting
facts that could be related to piracy off of Somalia is that a sample of about
700 active pirates in the Caribbean between 1715 and 1725 was composed
of different and mixed descent, ranging from American, West Indian,
Swedish, Dutch, and others.20 Not only were they of different nationalities,
but they were also racially diverse.21 “Based on data available from 23
15. BARRY HART DUBNER, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL SEA PIRACY (1980).
16. See Harvard Research in Int’l Law, Draft Convention on Piracy, with
Comment, 26 AM. J. INT’L L. SUPP. 739 (1932).
17. Id. at 787 (“It is expediency that should be the chief guide in the formulation of a
convention.”).
18. See, e.g., BRITISH PIRACY IN THE GOLDEN AGE: HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION,
1660-1730 (Joel H. Baer ed., 2007) (citing the years 1660-1730).
19. DANIEL DEFOE, A GENERAL HISTORY OF THE PYRATES 87 (Manuel Schonhorn ed.,
Courier Dover Pub’ns 1999) (1724).
20. Peter T. Leeson, An-arrgh-chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization,
115 J.POL. ECON 1049, 1054 (2007) [hereinafter Leeson, An-arrgh-chy].
21. Id.
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pirate crews active between 1682 and 1726, the racial composition of ships
varied between 13 and 98 percent black.” 22 If this sample is representative,
then 25-30 percent of the average pirates were of “African descent.”23 This
is an important statistic because one of the arguments against attacking
pirates ashore, which was made at the Harvard meeting that Professor
Dubner attended in December 2009, was the fact that many of the countries
that were trying to thwart piracy today, are composed of Caucasians and are
usually Christian, whereas the Somalians are mostly people of color and
Muslim. Today, the international community does not want to appear as
though it is starting a racial or religious crusade over the crime of piracy. It
will be demonstrated later in this essay that the economics of piracy requires
an understanding of the religious dimension involved because Hawawal,
which is an informal money transfer system used almost solely by Muslims,
is also the primary system pirates use to launder ransom payments.24
In the classical period the total number of pirates that existed according
to pirate historians “[b]etween 1716 and 1722 . . . were between 1,0002,000 sea bandits.”25 In an interesting footnote, Leeson pointed out that the
“Royal Navy averaged only 13,000 men in any one year between 1716 and
1726, making the pirate population in a good year more than 15 percent of
the navy population.”26 In 1680, the total population of the American
colonies was less than 152,000 according to Leeson.27 In fact, as late as
1790 when the first U.S. census was taken, only 24 places in the country
had a population greater of 2,500.28
Unlike today where Somali pirates go out on skiffs and make use of
mother ships, the average crew size, between the period of 1716 and 1726,
was about 80 members.29 Some pirate crews were close to 120 members and
crews of 150 to 200 were not uncommon.” 30 Several pirate crews were
reported to be bigger than this. For example, Leeson notes that
“Blackbeard’s crew aboard the Queen Anne’s Revenge was 300 men.”31
22. Id.
23. Id. (citing KENNETH J. KINKOR, BLACK MEN UNDER THE BLACK FLAG, IN BANDITS
AT SEA: A P IRATES READER, 195, 200-01 (C.R. Pennell ed., 2001)).
24. See Hawala System, GLOBAL JIHAD, http://www.globaljihad.net/view_page.asp?
id=1171 (last visited Mar. 9, 2012).
25. Leeson, An-arrgh-chy, supra note 20, at 1054 (citation omitted).
26. Id. at 1054 n.14 (citing REDIKER, supra note 28, at 256).
27. Id. (citing JONATHAN HUGHES & LOUIS P. CAIN, AMERICAN ECONOMIC HISTORY
20 (4th ed. 1994)).
28. Id. (citing HUGHES & CAIN, supra note 30, at 28).
29. Id. at 1054 (citing REDIKER, supra note 29, at 256).
30. Id. at 1054-55.
31. Leeson, An-arrgh-chy, supra note 20, at 1055 (quoting DAVID CORDINGLY,
UNDER THE BLACK FLAG: THE ROMANCE AND THE REALITY OF LIFE AMONG THE PIRATES 16566 (2006)). “[A] sixth-rate Royal Navy ship in the early eighteenth century carried more
crew members than the average pirate vessel (about 150). . . . Furthermore, some pirate
crews were too large to fit in one ship. . . .[and would form] squadrons.” Id. at 1055 (citation
omitted). Professor Leeson gives as an example Captain Bartholomew Roberts commanding
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Apparently, many of the multiple pirate ships joined concerted plundering
expeditions, for example:
The most impressive fleets of sea bandits belong to the buccaneers. . . .
Captain Morgan commanded a fleet of 37 ships and 2,000 men sufficient
to attack coastal communities on the Spanish Main. 32

Ships joining into fleets or becoming fleets apparently was nothing out
of the ordinary in those days. The manner in which pirate organizations
operate today is comparable to the way pirates operated in the classical
period. Much like today, pirates in the classical period did not acquire their
ships by purchase or otherwise; they stole them.33 It has not been
uncommon for pirates off of Somalia to steal a fishing vessel, for example,
and use it as a mother ship. Naturally, all the pirates followed the basic rule
of “‘no prey, no pay.’”34 As will be seen later in this paper, the amount of
pay and how it is divided is very similar to the way things are done today.
For example, after they captured a ship “[t]he hunters’ pay will generally be
200 pieces of eight; the carpenter, for his work . . ., would be paid 100 to
150 pieces of eight; the surgeon would receive 200 or 250 for his medical
supplies.”35 Pirates even had a set amount for the loss of limb or other
injuries. For a loss of the right arm, (i.e., 600 pieces of eight or six slaves);
for a left arm 500 pieces of eight or five slaves; “the left leg was 400 and
four slaves; an eye 100 or one slave and the same award was made for the
loss of a finger.”36 Also, articles of piracy (i.e., a chasse-partie) would set
forth all of the “duty” among the officers and crews.37 In addition to the
above amounts, which were withdrawn from the capital:
[T]he rest of the prize would be divided into as many portions as men on
the ship. The captain draws four or five men’s portions for the use of the
ship, perhaps even more, and two portions for himself. The rest of the
men share uniformly, and the boys get half a man’s share.38
a squadron of four ships to carry 508 men. Id. (citing CORDINGLY, supra, at 111, 165-66);
REDIKER, supra note 28 at 107.
32. Id. (citing ALEXANDER O. EXQUEMELIN, THE BUCCANEERS OF AMERICA 171
(Alexis Brown trans., Dover 2000) (1678).
33. Id. at 1064. “There is at least one eighteenth-century pirate, however, Stede
Bonnet, who actually purchased the first ship he went on the account with.” Id. n.30.
34. Id. at 1070. (“The buccaneers called their articles a chasse-partie. These articles
specified the division of booty among the officers and crew along with other terms of the
buccaneers’ organization. All sea bandits followed the basic rule of ‘no prey, no pay.’ Unless
a pirating expedition was successful, no man received any payment.”).
35. Leeson, An-arrgh-chy, supra note 20 (quoting EXQUEMELIN, supra note 35, at
71-72).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1069-70.
38. Id. at 1070. See also id. at 1076 (“The evidence also suggests that piratical
articles were successful in preventing internal conflict and creating order aboard pirate ships.
Pirates, it appears, strictly adhered to their articles.”).
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Piratical organization in the classical period also received a significant
sum from their plunder:
At a time when Anglo-American seamen on a trading voyage to
Madagascar were collecting less than twelve pounds sterling a year . . . the
deep-water pirates could realize a hundred or even a thousand times more .
. . The amount of money was rather enormous. In 1695, for example,
Henry Every’s pirate fleet captured a prize carrying more than £600,000 in
precious metals and jewels. The resulting share-out earned each member
of his crew £1,000, the equivalent of nearly 80 years [sic]’ income for an
able merchant seaman at the time. In the early eighteenth century, Captain
John Bowen’s pirate crew plundered a prize ‘which yielded them 500
[pounds] per Man. Several years later, Captain Thomas White’s crew
retired to Madagascar after a marauding expedition each pirate having
earned £1,200 from the cruise. In 1720, Captain Christopher Condent’s
crew seized a prize that earned each pirate £3,000. In 1721, Captain John
Taylor and Oliver La Bouche’s pirate consort earned an astonishing
£4,000 for each crew member from a single attack. Even the small pirate
crew, captained by John Evens in 1722 took enough booty to split ‘nine
thousand Pounds among thirty Persons’—or £300 a pirate. To put these
earnings in perspective, compare them to the able merchant seaman’s
wage over the same period. Between 1689 and 1740 this varied from 25 to
55 shillings per month, a meager £15 to £33 per year. 39

It will be shown that these figures are comparable to the figures that exist
for Somali pirates today. For example, a Somali pirate today can earn
between $168,630 and $394,200 in the course of five years, whereas their
next best alternative yields a meager $14,500 over their entire life time.40
One important fact that can be learned from reviewing classical pirate
profits is that “[p]irate crew members—the piratical firm’s employees—
jointly owned and operated the piratical firm.”41 Sound familiar? This is
because there have been numerous studies regarding the amount and
structure of ownership and funding of pirates today. Pirates today operate
through external funding, which comes from different sources, including the
39. Id. at 1077-78 (citation omitted) (Konstam’s original text states that £1,000 is the
equivalent of nearly 80 years’ income for an able merchant seaman, whereas Leeson, in
quoting Konstam, stated £1,000 is the equivalent of nearly 40 years income). In 1932 John
Robert Moore, an American scholar of Daniel Defoe published his theory that Charles
Johnson was really Daniel Defoe writing under his pen name. Moore’s argument was so
persuasive that most libraries catalogued Johnson’s books under Defoe’s name for the next
50 years. Leeson cites Charles Johnson throughout his publication, however many of
Leeson’s references may possibly be catalogued under Daniele Defoe. See e.g., BARB KARG
& ARJEAN , THE EVERYTHING PIRATES BOOK: A SWASHBUCKLING HISTORY OF ADVENTURE ON
THE HIGH SEAS 223 (Adams Media, 2007).
40. See GEOPOLICITY, infra note 62, at iv.
41. Peter T. Leeson, The Invisible Hook: The Law and Economics of Pirate
Tolerance, 4 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 139, 151 (2009) [hereinafter Leeson, The Invisible
Hook].
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underworld.42 In the classical period, however, pirates did not require
external financiers, for “each employee of the piratical firm was nearly a
partner: a near-equal firm-owner with an equal say in firm activities, such as
whether the crew would continue on the account (or retire), who would lead
the crew, and so on.”43 In the classical period the pirate pay scale was
extremely flat, the difference between the highest and lowest paid person
was only a single share.”44
In contrast, modern day pirates have a large disparity within their pay
scale. The stark difference in the pay scales of pirates and their backers
allows the top commanding backer to receive nearly one hundred times
more than a bottom level employee.45 Journalist Jay Bahadur, in an article
titled “Pirates Inc.,” described one instance of this payment structure.46 Mr.
Bahadur’s article focused on the pirates that captured crewmembers aboard
the MV Victoria.47 The Pirates ransom payment was distributed as follows:48
Position
Officers
Commander-in-chief, Financial Backer
“Computer”
Interpreter Loyanne
Accountant Mustuku
Supplies logistics officer
“Commander of the Khat”
Attackers
First to board the MV Victoria
Mohamad Abdi
Eight others
Cooks
Head Chef
Sous-chef
Holders
20 men
TOTAL

Salary
$900,000
$60,000
$60,000
$30,000

$150,000
(plus Land Cruiser bonus)
$41,000 each
$20,000
$9,000
$12,000 each
~$1,800,000

42. See, e.g., Rob Walker, Inside Story of Somali Pirate Attack, BBC NEWS (June 4,
2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8080098.stm.
43. Leeson, The Invisible Hook, supra note 41, at 151.
44. Id.
45. Jay Bhadur, Pirates, Inc., FIN. TIMES (London), June 23, 2010,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e5f60614-7d23-11df-8845-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1x3TabtjB.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. M.V. Victoria was hijacked by eight pirates in the Gulf of Aden on May 5,
2009 while on its way to the Saudi port of Jeddah. One million, eight hundred thousand
dollars in ransom was paid. The table shows how the ransom payment was divided. Id.
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After discussing what each pirate received, Mr. Bahadur stated:
As in any pyramid scheme, the clear winner was the man on the top.
Computer was responsible for supplying start-up capital worth roughly
$40,000, which went toward the attack boat, outboard motors, weapons,
food and fuel. For this investment he received half of the total ransom, or
$900,000. After subtracting the operating expenses of $230,000 that the
group incurred during the Victoria’s captivity in Eyl, Computer’s return
on the investment would have been enviable 1,600 per cent.49

The hijacking of the MV Victoria, which amounted to a ransom payment
of $1.8 million, represents a small part of the greater pirate industry that
causes over $12 billion of damage annually.50 Because of this, we now turn
to the statistics provided by two recent economic studies which show in
detail the financial impact of piracy on the international community.
III. THE PRESENT DAY ECONOMICS OF SEA PIRACY AND THE COST TO THE
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
A. Background
During the meeting at the Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government,
one of the main concerns expressed was the fact that piracy had changed
over the years from the simple theft of a ship’s money or of a ship to a
criminal industry backed by organized crime. There, in December 2009, it
was estimated that “[a]bout 1,500 pirates were involved, with 7 syndicates
and fewer ‘bosses’ controlling separate but linked enterprises [that are]
largely financed and brokered from Kenya, Dubai, Lebanon, Somalia, and
elsewhere.”51 Although Russia was mentioned, nothing was shown at the
time that indicated that the Russian mafia was involved.52 A chart
concerning finances (“the money paper trail”) was introduced at this
meeting, as follows:

49. Bhadur, supra note 45.
50. See, e.g., Anna Bowden et al., The Economic Cost of Maritime Piracy 25 (One
Earth Future, Working Paper, Dec. 2010), available at http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/
sites/default/files/documents_old/The_Economic_Cost_of_Piracy_Full_Report.pdf.
“The
main direct costs of piracy, [include] the cost of ransoms, piracy insurance premiums,
deterrent equipment, re-routing vessels away from piracy risk zones, naval deployments in
piracy hot zones, piracy prosecutions, and organization budgets dedicated to reducing
piracy.” Id.
51. ROTBERG, supra note 1, at 3.
52. Id.
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Thereafter, in July 2011, a report was issued by the Financial Action
Task Force Groupe d’action Financiére (FATF*GAFI).54 The FATF “is an
independent inter-governmental body that develops and promotes policies
to protect the global financial system against money laundering and terrorist
financing.”55 The report was broken up into two parts: maritime piracy for
ransom (MPR) and kidnapping for ransom (KFR).56 One of the more
interesting points made by the study was as follows:
With ransom demands and payments for the release of vessels and
hostages escalating, there appears to be a definite link to money flows
related to both those who are financing piracy and the proceeds of this
criminal activity. Despite this, international maritime operations involving

53.
54.

Id.
FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, ORGANIZED MARITIME PIRACY AND RELATED
KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM (2011), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/40/
13/48426561.pdf [hereinafter FATF Report].
55. Id. at 2.
56. Id. at 3. The Report contained, for example, case studies concerning the financial
aspects of maritime piracy for ransom. The executive summary contains a statement saying
that this is the “first comprehensive picture” of maritime piracy for ransom (as well as
kidnapping for ransom) and their “attempts to outline the financial implications to these
activities” as well as the work to be done in the future. Id. at 5.

756

Michigan State International Law Review

[Vol. 20:3

warships from dozens of countries remains the primary response against
PFR.57

If this is so, it is because the international community believes that
stopping the acts of piracy at these stages should take priority due to the
number of sailors that are being held for ransom as well as being killed and
tortured. Also, industry professionals who deal with the payment of ransoms
have little interest in insisting on the understanding of where the monies are
being distributed. What they are more interested in is getting the vessels
back.58
The FAFT report shows that within the past few years the piracy for
ransom situation has grown rapidly:
In 2010, hijackings off the coast of Somalia resulted in 49 vessels captured
and 1016 hostages taken, as well as eight fatalities. Another four vessels
with 165 crew members were hijacked elsewhere in the world. As of 3
March 2011, 33 vessels were being held, including one that was converted
to use as a pirate “mother ship.” A total of 711 were also being held. In the
first two months of 2011, seven fatalities resulted from PFR-related
attacks.59

As this is going on, “[r]ansoms are rising exponentially, having increased
from an average of $150,000 per vessel/crew accrued in 2005 to an
estimated $5.2 million per vessels/crew in 2010.”60 “[A]pproximately
USD180-238 million were reportedly paid in ransoms in 2010. The total
57. Id. at 7 (emphasis added). The result of this report is that the piracy off the coast
of Somalia, is creating major problems for the international community: inter alia, “money
laundering/proceeds” and the “multi-dimensional threat to financial systems, including . . .[ ]
shipping costs, inflation of insurance premiums for vessels and cargos, freedom of commerce
on the high seas, and the rise in ransom payments themselves.” Id.
58. Id. “One of the most spectacular increases in the costs of piracy in recent years
has been the increasing price of ransoms paid to release hijacked ships. Ransoms are
generally sought by Somali pirates. Pirates in other regions have more often stolen the vessel
or cargo, rather than ransoming the value of the seafarers’ lives and their ship. In November
2010, the highest ransom on record, $9.5 million, was paid to Somali pirates to release the
Samho Dream, a South Korean oil tanker. Indeed, 2010 set a remarkable record for the cost
of ransoms, with the year kicking off to a $7 million ransom paid in January to release the
Greek supertanker MV Maran Centaurus, which had been carrying $162 million of crude oil
from Saudi Arabia to the United States.” FATF Report, supra note 51 at 9. FATF
emphasized that if a pirate organization knows an individual, business, or other entity is
willing to pay ransoms, the greater the likelihood that those who pay will be targeted again.
Id. Also, “the more companies are willing to pay regularly, the more lucrative piracy as a
business becomes. Today insurance costs have skyrocketed to the point that some companies
would rather take a chance sailing through pirate-ridden waters and pay ransoms than
repeatedly pay monumental premiums.” Mayann Lawlor, Signal Magazine, Piracy Threatens
Global Economy (June 2010), available at http://www.afcea.org/signal/articles/templates/
Signal_Article_Template.asp?articleid=2304&zoneid=285.
59. FATF Report, supra note 54, at 7-8 (footnote omitted).
60. Id. at 8.
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cost of PFR-related incidents, including vessel-related cost, depreciation
and spoilage of goods, together with increased cost to manufacturers,
shipping companies, maritime insurers, labor cost were estimated to be
[USD] 7-12 billion per annum.”61
Consistent with the economic studies presented in the FATF Report, in
May 2011, the following table was presented by Geopolicity:62
HEADLINES (Based on Available Data):63
Low/High Pirate income (2010):
Using 1,500 Pirates
Potential Lifetime Earnings (2010:
Using 1,500 Pirates
Next Best Alternative:
Pirates Incomes Compared to
Average Income:
No. Pirates Could Double by:
Total Cost of Piracy 2010:
Projected Increase by 2014:
Major Stakeholders:

~US$33,000-US$79,000/year
~US$168,000 US $394,000
~US$500/year
~67-157 higher
~2016
~US$4.9-8.3 billion
~US$13-15 billion
Financiers, Sponsors, Officials, Pirates,
Maritime Insurers, Security Companies,
Navies, Merchant Marine

In the economic model, Geopolicity assesses the cost and benefits of
international piracy and creates a “value chain” where the
[g]reatest rates of return on international counter pirate investment and
policy are to be found. The model includes [a]: i) a cost-benefit analysis at
the individual pirate level, based on existing socioeconomic and market
data ii) the aggregate cost- benefit analysis at the international systems
level[,] and iii) comprehensive data on the resurgence of piracy by

61. Id. (footnotes omitted). In calculating the total damage that piracy has caused to
the international community it is also important to note that
[t]he total cost of ransom is estimated to be around double the value actually paid to pirates.
The total cost is duplicated by a number of factors, such as: the cost of negotiations,
psychological trauma counseling, repair to ship damage caused while it is held captive, and
the physical delivery of the ransom money, often done by helicopter or private plane. Finally,
large costs result from ships being held and out of service. For instance, it costs around $3
million for a cargo ship to be held for two months at a charter hire rate of $50,000 per day.
Bowden, supra note 50, at 9-10 (footnotes omitted).
62. GEOPOLICITY, THE ECONOMICS OF PIRACY: PIRATE RANSOMS & LIVELIHOODS OFF
THE COAST OF SOMALIA (2011), available at http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/
geopolicity_-_the_economics_of_piracy_-_pirates__livelihoods_off_the_coast_of_somalia.pdf.
63. Id. at cover page.
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functional classification sovereign jurisdiction . . . [which] include[s]
trend, comparator, and predictive analysis.64

Geopolicity also made what they called an “executive summary outline”
which it hoped would benefit the CGPCS.65 In the summary and subsequent
study, Geopolicity estimates the cost of piracy to the international
community as between $4.9-8.3 billion in 2010.66 It foresees estimates of
$13-15 billion by the year 2015.67 The report also states that the income to
pirates off the coast of Somalia alone in 2010 was between $75-238 million
and could rise to $200-400 million by 2015.68 “Assuming only 1,500 active
pirates exist off the coa[s]ts of Somalia, a pirate can expect to earn between
$168,630 and $394,200 over a theoretical five-year career.”69 If these
individuals were not pirates they could hope to earn, at best, approximately
$14,500 over their entire working life.70 This “report also runs scenarios
based on 3,000 pirates.”71 It predicts that the amount of increase in the
number of pirates will jump from 200 to 400 in an annual rate based on
present demand assumptions.72 By the time this study by Geopolicity was
written, “[t]he expansion of global piracy incidents . . . increased from 276
in 2005 to 445 in 2010 (219 of which were off the coast of Somalia).”73
“This [number] could increase to more than 600 incidents by 2015, based on
the application of supply/demand and opportunity cost theory.”74 The study
suggests that the significant proportion of proceeds (between forty and fifty
percent) are transferred out of Somalia using informant money transfer
systems, presenting a vulnerability to the Anti-Money Laundering/
Countering the Finance of Terrorism (AML/CFT) system.75
As a result of this data, Geopolicity proposes a 3-phase independent
economic research program which includes: strengthening and overcoming
data paucity constraints; producing quarterly updates for the international
community; undertaking country level financial tracking and sponsorship
research; strengthening the understanding of the entire value chain; and
64. Id. at iv.
65. Id.
66. Id. at iv, 9.
67. Geopolicity, supra note 62, at iv.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. The figures are comparable to that of the classical period where a small pirate
crew could take £300 in one expedition whereas the next best alternative was £15 to £33 per
year. Leeson, An-arrgh-chy, supra note 20, at 1078.
71. See GEOPOLICITY, supra note 62, at iv.
72. Id.
73. Id. The International Maritime Bureau Piracy Reporting Centre on June 7, 2012
indicated, 157 worldwide incidents, of which 61 were off the Coast of Somalia. See Piracy
News & Figures, ICC COMMERCIAL CRIME SERVICES, http://www.icc-ccs.org/piracyreporting-centre/piracynewsafigures (last visited Jun. 10, 2012).
74. See GEOPOLICITY, supra note 62, at iv.
75. Id.
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developing a framework of corrective measures that focus on policy,
institutional, security sector reform, law enforcement, prevention, and
systems monitoring.76
An interesting point that the Geopolicity study raises is that the origins of
piracy off the coast of Somalia can be traced back to the political, economic,
and social unrest, which characterized Somalia in the mid-1990s.77 It also
points out that in the absence of a functioning central government, some
Somali fishermen assumed the role of protecting Somali waters from both
illegal dumping of waste by foreigners as well as over-fishing.78 The report
calls these vigilante activities, which has led to selecting piracy as a way to
supplement livelihoods.79 Additionally, it also points out that there are few
legal alternatives for some of these impoverished Somalis.80 Some authors
have suggested that Somalia may be better off stateless and set forth before
and after scenarios to demonstrate their point, which to the authors, is
simply ridiculous.81
The main problem is that the crime of international sea piracy is
becoming institutionalized with respect to entrenched organization
structures and self-financing mechanisms.82 There have been suggestions of
linkages between pirates and terrorist groups, but that connect has not been
determined definitively.83 Piracy has been considered haram (forbidden)
under Islam, yet there are many anecdotes of Somali pirates paying
“docking fees” and “taxes” to Al-Shabaab and possibly to other Islamic
terrorist groups.84 There was a report by a foreign press in February 2011,
indicating that al-Shabaab ordered pirates in central Somalia to provide a
cut of twenty percent of their profits to the terrorist group.85 When the
pirates refused to do so, al-Shabaab reportedly detained four of the pirates’

76. Id.
77. Id. at 8.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. (citing U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, PIRACY REPORT (2011), available at
www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa.piracy.c32662.htm).
81. Because Somalia has been able to improve its performance on a number of
human development indicators despite the absence of government leads authors to formulate
arguments that suggest Somali is better off stateless. The fact of the matter is Somalia has
endured two decades of war, beset by droughts and now the only lucrative opportunity in that
region is piracy. The cash brought in through piracy may cause some economic growth, but
at what cost? A state run by terrorists and organized crime syndicates is by no means better
than a state which functions through an elected government. See, e.g., Peter T. Leeson, Better
Off Stateless: Somalia Before and After Government Collapse, 35 J. COMP. ECON. 689
(2007).
82. Bahadur, supra note 45.
83. FATF Report, supra note 54, at 9.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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investors.86 Thankfully, in December 2011, Islamist militants were ousted
from the Somali capital, Mogadishu, and U.N. officials viewed this event as
a brief window of opportunity to set up a working government in Somalia.87
The worry, nevertheless, still remains that piracy will continue to be an
“attractive option to [certain] terrorist groups in the future.”88
B. Analyzing the ‘Money Trail’ of Present Day Sea Piracy
In order to restrain the growth of Somali Piracy, the Geopolicity group
points out that the key focus of future research should be in, “(i) the
payment of money and laundering of ransom payments (ii) asset tracing (iii)
where relevant informal money transfer systems (iv) pirate value chain
analysis . . . “89 In addition, the important fact to be considered is that the
ransom payment can be collected and consolidated anywhere in the world.90
The payments made for the release of crews and vessels can also be spent
and converted into different types of financial instruments, or used to
purchase real property and other fixed assets in multiple jurisdictions as
well:
A common ratio that academic experts use in theorizing about the amount
of PFR-related monies remaining in Somalia versus the amount leaving
there is 60/40. However, even if indeed “only” 40% of ransom proceeds
leave Somalia, the actual and potential exploitation of the financial sector
by those who commit and support PFR globally still represents a money
laundering and terrorist financing threat. For example, based on the USD
238 million in ransoms reportedly paid to Somali pirates in 2010,
approximately USD 95 million would comprise the 40% sent out of the
country. This is a significant amount of illicit finance relative to the region
that could enter the international financial system in a variety of
jurisdictions. . . . 91

The Report of the FATF also shows that there are three basic means of
financing the piracy industry.92 In all three cases, the pirate leader is wellconnected and a person respected in the community, and is thus able to
draw upon his personal network for protection and problem solving:
86. Id. The link between piracy and terrorism can also include the sale or transfer of
hostages to terrorist groups. See, e.g., Abdalle Ahmed, Somalia: British Couple Held
Hostage in Harardhere Transferred to Unknown Location, Pirate Says, RBC RADIO (Apr.
29, 2010, 01:52 PM), http://www.raxanreeb.com/dev/2010/04/somalia-british-couple-heldhostage-in-harardhere-transferred-to-unknown-location-pirate-says/.
87. See Somalia’s Rare Window of Hope, BBC NEWS (Dec. 13, 2011),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16156157.
88. FATF Report, supra note 54, at 10.
89. GEOPOLICITY, supra note 62, at 13.
90. FATF Report, supra note 54, at 10.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 17.
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1. A cottage industry structure in which the whole operation is owned
by a single funder. He may lead the group, and, if the hijacking is
successful, takes the largest share of the ransom payment.
2. A shareholder or cooperative structure in which individual pirates
invest in the operation and share the PRF proceeds. Each pirate is equipped
with his own weapon and other gear, and supplies his own food and other
necessities. The boat is owned by a member of each “cooperative.”
3. A syndicate or committee structure formed by several investors.
Syndicates are responsible for the majority of hijackings. They arm and
equip several pirate groups and draw up contracts for PFR operations and
the distribution of ransom payments. Successful syndicates can command as
much as a 50 per cent share of a ransom payment.93
Of the three forms of financing piracy, the syndicate model, according to
the FATF, has generated the most amount of interest.94 Today, shares in a
given syndicate can cost between five to ten thousand dollars each.95
The committee may have direct access to the pirate leadership, or may
choose to . . . use a facilitator to transport the funds to the pirate group. An
agreement specifies the amount of money they are collectively providing;
usually has the name of the individual receiving this money and how much
the investors require as a return.96

The pirates will issue two types of shares in the venture: “A” shares, in
which the individual receives a percentage of the ransom, and are reserved
for investors, pirate leaders and the successful pirate crew; and “B” shares,
which entitle the individual to a fixed fee.97 The report indicates that “A”
shares generally go to investors, pirate leadership and pirate crew, and “B”
shares are paid to individuals with singular tasks such as armed guards,
interpreters, and middlemen.98 This investor scheme setup also displays
characteristics similar to those employed in conventional organized crime.99

93. Id.
94. Id.
95. FATF Report, supra note 54, at 17. One report indicated that at present, it costs
investors approximately six thousand dollars to send a team of pirates out searching for ships
to hijack. This money goes toward the purchase of food, ammunition, and fuel and the rental
of rocket-propelled grenade launchers and speedboats. Even though it costs investors six
thousand dollars to send a team of pirates, each investor must be prepared to fund several
failed attempts. When an investor’s team succeeds, the investor receives upwards of thirty
percent of the total ransom. Walker, supra note 52. Based on this report, an investment of
approximately 40 thousand to one hundred thousand dollars can bring in millions of dollars
profit. Because of the potential payoff for investors piracy is turning into an extremely
lucrative enterprise.
96. FATF Report, supra note 54.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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Accompanying the distribution of shares schematic, the FAFT Report
indicates that in 2006 the estimated total ransom money paid to Somali
pirates was $5 million in 2006; $25 million in 2007; $70 million in 2008;
$80 million in 2009 and $180 million in 2010. 100
Even the type of notes that comprise the ransom payment differ from
“USD 100 notes (90%); USD 50 notes (7%) and in USD 20 notes (3%).
Eighty percent of the ransoms are delivered by airdrop as it entails less risk
than any other method . . . . [M]any experts believe that a significant
amount of the money—from 40-60%—never leaves Somalia. Proportions
of the profits are offered to various groups, including [t]he initial investors,
payments to local clan chiefs and militia, reinvesting in weapons and
equipment, payments to the pirates’ leader and the other pirates, both the
initial hijackers as well as the guards. 101

The report goes on to indicate that the proceeds of piracy have been used
to purchase real estate in Puntland as well as areas in Kenya such as
Eastleigh in Mombasa.102
In addition, the report has set forth various case studies in order to
illustrate not only the brazen nature of Somali piracy but also the somewhat
uncoordinated nature of the international community in detecting,
interdicting, and deterring hijacking.103 The report claims that the
“disjointed nature of cooperation between shipping companies, maritime
insurance underwriters, law enforcement, financial intelligence units, and
post-incident investigators in sharing information” ultimately leads to the
inability to follow the financial trail pirates almost always leave behind.104
One of the conclusions of the case study is that the “Somali pirates are
becoming ‘[i]ncreasingly reliant on the international financial system and
other money service provider to move cash off-shore [in order] to finance
other activities.’”105
The report also demonstrates the generic typology for PFR operations off
the coast of Somalia:
[A] vessel is seized, the owner or management company is contacted, and
a ransom payment is negotiated, often by third party intermediaries. The
insurance company of the hijacked vessel then arranges for a cash
payment. The cash is obtained from a financial institution, which may be
the insurance company itself, and packaged for delivery, often being
100. Id. at 18. “The actual figures are assumed to be higher than these, because the
shipping industry does not always report the total ransom amounts accurately.” FATF
Report, supra note 54, at 18.
101. FATF Report, supra note 54.
102. Id. at 19.
103. See generally FATF Report, supra note 54, at 11-12.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 13.
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airdropped to a prearranged location. These payments seem to demonstrate
two money laundering/terrorist financing vulnerabilities: that these
payments often do not result in bulk cash disclosures/declarations and/or
suspicious transaction reporting to the FIUs [Financial Intelligence Unit].
This occurs either because jurisdictions lack these requirements and/or
those facilitating the payments of ransoms are successfully evading these
reporting requirements. Once ransoms are paid and the cash subsequently
enters Somalia, “following the money” becomes difficult because there are
no mechanisms to identify the source and destination of these funds and
because the trail goes cold if such payments were not previously reported
to FIUs and other AML/ CFT authorities.106

Rather than the typical classical situation where pirates buried their loot
on some remote, usually uninhabited island, or tendered over a percentage
of it to the government that was sponsoring them, the Somali piracy
situation presents the need for targeting financial activity of pirates,
especially their financiers and instigators, through the freezing and seizure
of assets, and the confiscation of the proceeds and instrumentalities of
piracy.107 This method
[c]ould help to (1) disrupt financial support to pirate organizations, (2)
track and seize (either through post-conviction or non-conviction based
forfeiture, depending on the jurisdiction) assets enabling pirate operations,
(3) prevent pirates from using the international banking system and other
formal financial systems, and (4) prevent pirates from using cash couriers
and other informal-value transfer mechanisms to transmit funds. . . . 108

One of the most important findings is that
[o]ne of the most challenging conditions is the lack of capacity in the
regions where piracy occurs. In particular, Somalia has no formal
authorities or structures to implement an AML, and Puntland is known for
its complicity. The countries surrounding Somalia are characterized by
lack of capacity: Kenya has no FIU [Financial Intelligence Unit] and has
not begun implementation of its ALM law. The AML/CFT regimes of
Ethiopia, Seychelles, Yemen, and Tanzania are in varying degrees of
development and implementation while, Uganda does not have an ALM
law at all. 109

106. Id. Note that FIU stands for Financial Intelligence Unit, AML stands for AntiMoney Laundering, and CFT stands for Countering the Finance of Terrorism.
107. Id. at 20.
108. Id.
109. FATF Report, supra note 54, at 22.
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This is particularly alarming because these regions account for the
majority of piracy prosecutions today.110 “Even in countries [that have a]
traditionally higher capacity including countries that have a cursory
ALM/CFT regime, there is a lack of consistency regarding bulk cash
reporting, interdiction and investigation, hawala money server business
regulation, reporting regimes and investigation.”111
Where does this all lead us? In terms of the “number of [s]tates
prosecuting acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia in their courts,” the
statistics show that the number of participating courts has risen from [ten] to
[twenty]; and the total number of prosecutions taking place has nearly
doubled from 528 to 1,011.”112 Kenya alone has convicted 119 pirates and
Somalia, surprisingly has, according to U.N. data, tried 290 pirates in
Puntland and convicted 240 of them.113 In Somaliland, there were 94 trials
and 68 convictions, and in South Central Somalia there were eighteen trials
held.114 Altogether, approximately 20 states have tried pirates, and over
1,000 trials have been held since the date of this U.N. report.115 Much of the
international resources, which are being spent today are used to arrest and
prosecute pirates through international naval operations. By allocating the
majority of resources to prosecuting pirates at sea, less emphasis has been
placed on prosecution through the tracing of the ransom payments. Given
the syndicate nature of piracy and the fact that nearly 50% of the ransom is
110. See, e.g., Press Release, Security Council, Human Cost of Piracy Off Somalia
Coast ‘Incalculable’, Full Range of Legal. Preventative Measures Needed To Thwart
Attacks, Security Council Told, U.N. Doc. SC/10551 (Feb. 22, 2012).
111. Id. at 22. Hawala (also known as hundi) is an informal money transfer system,
used almost solely by Muslims, based on performance and honor of a huge network of
money brokers who are primarily located in the Muslim World — Middle East, Africa
and Asia. Hawala has its origins in classic Islamic Law — the Sharia — and is mentioned in
texts already as early as the 8th century. Hawala itself later influenced the development of
the Western Common Law and Civil Law such as the French Aval (Avallo in Italian). In the
most basic variant of the Hawala system, money is transferred via a network of Hawala
brokers, or Hawaladars. A customer approaches a Hawala broker in one city and gives a
sum of money to be transferred to a recipient in another, usually foreign, city. The Hawala
broker calls another Hawala broker in the recipient’s city, gives disposition instructions of
the funds (usually minus a small commission), and promises to settle the debt at a later date.
The disposition is executed based solely of the mutual trust and credibility between the two
brokers without any further documentation. As the system does not depend on the legal
enforceability of claims, it can operate even in the absence of a legal and judicial
environment. No records are produced of individual transactions — only a running tally of
the amount owed by one broker to another is kept. Hawala is attractive to customers because
it provides a fast and convenient transfer of funds, usually with a far lower commission than
that charged by banks. Furthermore, the transfers are informal and not effectively regulated
by governments, which is a major advantage to customers. Hawala is also an ideal system
for laundering money for those who trust the system. See Hawala System, supra note 24.
112. The Modalities, supra note 2, at 27.
113. Id. at 27-28.
114. Id. at 28.
115. Id.
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distributed to only a few individuals, the figures make it clear that finding
the few individuals that invest in piracy can result in bringing down an
entire operation. Because of this, reports such as those from Geopolicity
explicitly state that it is vital to target piracy through the pirate value chain,
concentrating on the payment of money, laundering of ransom payments,
tracking of assets, and analyzing the informal (hawala) money transfer
systems.116
The next section explores the complexity of tracing ransom money. What
is important to note is that there are two simultaneous streams of commerce
in which pirate ransom money can be placed. Low level Somali pirates that
collect ransom payments are likely to place their share of profits into their
local economies, whereas piracy investors are more likely to divert funds
through an intrinsic money laundering system. Interestingly, because of this
dichotomy, financial analysts must employ two radically different strategies
in attempting to trace the movement of ransom payments. Furthermore,
tracing this ransom money also reveals lucid ways in which modern piracy
is beginning to parallel piracy in the classical period.
C. Tracing the Ransom Payments Made to Pirate Organizations
Everybody agrees that the crime of piracy can only be stopped if the
conditions in Somalia improve. Somalia has endured two decades of war,
beset by drought and famine; it is now the home to both a lucrative piracy
industry and Islamist militant groups.117 For this reason, Somalia is
considered the ultimate failed state.118
Today, piracy in Somalia is starting to develop into a mini-economy,
which employs hundreds of people, all of whom share the ransom.119
Reports indicate that piracy in “Somalia is attracting big-time criminals
from all over the world.”120 As in the classical period, piracy today is a
transnational crime, and the entity, i.e. Somalia, operates without rules,
regulations or a functioning government.121 Because of this, “Somalis do not
need to launder the money they make from piracy because their unique
financial system operates on trust and honour, bypassing banks and other
financial institutions.”122 The piratical financial system, hawala, does not
116. FATF Report, supra note 54, at 13.
117. See Somalia’s Rare Window of Hope, BBC NEWS (Dec. 13, 2011),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16156157.
118. Id.
119. Mary Harper, Chasing the Somali Piracy Money Trail, BBC NEWS (May 24,
2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8061535.stm.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. This system of trust and honor also helps explain how pirates, in both the
classical era and today, can steal valuables from other ships, and share their profits, without
cheating or killing each other. In the classic era pirates operated through a democratic style
institution and their practices were institutionalized as the “custom of the coast.” The success
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involve documentation; most transactions are done verbally, so there is no
paper trail.123 The hawala system also “makes it almost impossible to find
out what happens to money made from ransom payments or any other
transactions in Somalia.” [Furthermore,] the fact that most ransoms are paid
in cash means they simply disappear into the Somali community, rather than
ending up in banks or other financial bodies.”124
Given the paucity and exceedingly opaque nature of the economic data
involved in pirate transactions, analysts are beginning to use atypical
methods for tracing the cash flow of ransom payments.125 For example, Anja
Shorthand, from the Economics and Finance Department at Brunel
University, has used province-level market data, nightlight emissions, and
high resolution satellite imagery to show that significant amounts of ransom
monies are spent within Somalia.126 Nightlight emissions, which are an
excellent proxy for local and regional production and income in statistically
challenged countries, shows that ‘pirates appear to invest their money
principally in the [Somali] cities of Garowe and Bosasso rather than in the
backward coastal communities.”127 Garowe and Bosasso are also known for
providing “the material inputs and the ‘fire power’ of [many] pirate
operations.”128 The change of light emissions is one method of detecting the
distribution of piracy income because, in impoverished regions, these

of pirates in the classical period was in many respects dependent on their organizational
achievements and mutual fairness. Being organized and mutually fair was less problematic
due to the fact that many of the pirates in the classical period were legitimate crewmen that
walked away because of ill-treatment by their former officers. Today, piracy is not only
growing but is becoming more organized than ever before. Trust, honor, organization, and
fairness is also the backbone of the piratical financial system, Hawala. Just as many pirates
in the classical period were legitimate crewmen, pirates today began as legitimate fisherman
whose waters were dumped in and over-fished by different organizations. Somalia is
stateless and unable to protect its territorial sea; therefore, it is rather easy for organizations
to exploit and pollute the Somali coast. This exploitation has led fishermen to lose their
livelihood and turn to piracy. As an aside, this trust and fairness among pirates is also the
reason why Pirates, like other colorful outlaws, have fascinated many readers throughout the
ages. See Pirates Had Democratic Ways, WORLD SCIENCE (Feb. 22, 2008),
http://www.world-science.net/othernews/080222_pirates.htm. See also Analysis: Somalia
Piracy Began in Response to Illegal Fishing and Toxic Dumping by Western Ships off Somali
Coast, DEMOCRACY NOW! (Apr. 14, 2009), available at http://www.democracynow.org/
2009/4/14/analysis_somalia_piracy_began_in_response.
123. Harper, supra note 119.
124. Id.
125. Note that Geopolicity proposed in its independent economic research program
that strengthening and overcoming data paucity constraints will strengthen understanding of
the entire piracy value chain. See GEOPOLICITY, supra note 62, at iv.
126. Anja Shortland, “Robin Hook”: The Developmental Effects of Somali Piracy 2
(German Inst. for Econ. Research, DIW Berlin, Discussion Paper No. 1155, 2011), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1940271.
127. Id. at 1.
128. Id. at 3.
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emissions indicate a clear sign of the movement in disposable income.129
The report also used high resolution satellite images to corroborate the
nightlight emission results; in Garowe, the satellite images showed
“massive investment in housing and hotels, infrastructure, and religious and
educational facilities between 2002 and 2009, with much of the
development taking place in the latter part of the period.”130
Anja Shorthand’s study also shows that finding pirates is extremely
challenging because of the deep-rooted “culture of sharing” in Somalia.131
Those who are more in Somalia raise their social status by sharing resources
within social, clan-based networks, where individuals have an obligation to
assist other members.132 “A Somali proverb says: ‘The man who owns 100
goats, but his relatives have nothing, he is poor.’”133 When “Pirate Chief
Abshir Boyah [was] questioned on how he spent his considerable profits
from piracy, [he stated,] ‘it’s not like three people split a million bucks. It’s
more like three hundred.’”134
Investors, on the other hand, who take the lion’s share, do not operate
within a “culture of sharing,” and therefore are less likely to spend ransom
money on items that create local economic development.135 Rather,
investors tend to spend ransom money on imported status goods such as
sport utility vehicles (SUVs) and divert their proceeds through intricate
money-laundering schemes.136 For analysts, tracing piracy ransom money
though an intricate money-laundering scheme is extremely difficult.
Appendix B shows how an intricate money-laundering scheme works when
illegal proceeds are mixed with legitimate used car sale profits in Africa,
and are sent to banks through exchange houses.137 The data in Appendix B
129. Id. at 16.
130. Id. at 3. The province-level market data, nightlight emissions and high-resolution
satellite imagery seems to provide a good initial step towards finding where suspected pirate
organizations are likely located.
131. Id. at 3.
132. Shortland, supra note 126, at 7.
133. Id. at 4.
134. Id. at 8.
135. Id. at 6, 7.
136. Id. at 7.
137. Jo Becker, Beirut Bank Seen as a Hub of Hezbollah’s Financing, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 13, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/14/world/middleeast/beirut-bank-seen-as-ahub-of-hezbollahs-financing.html?pagewanted=all (“American Treasury officials said senior
bank managers had assisted a handful of account holders in running a scheme to wash drug
money by mixing it with the proceeds of used cars bought in the United States and sold in
Africa. A cut of the profits, officials said, went to Hezbollah, a link the organization disputes.
. . . In all, hundreds of millions of dollars a year sloshed through the accounts, held mainly
by Shiite Muslim businessmen in the drug-smuggling nations of West Africa, many of them
known Hezbollah supporters, trading in everything from rough-cut diamonds to cosmetics
and frozen chicken, according to people with knowledge of the matter in the United States
and Europe. The companies appeared to be serving as fronts for Hezbollah to move all sorts
of dubious funds, on its own behalf or for others.”).
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was gathered from a drug money laundering operation, which had ties to
organizations in Africa, Europe, China, South America and the United
States.138 Maritime security expert Christopher Ledger has expressed that
the drug trade and piracy are similar in many respects; drug trade, “which
started off as a relatively small-time operation” has grown into a “huge
global crime,” which is also the path maritime piracy seems to be taking.139
Moreover, international piracy is starting to replicate the drug industry in
the United States, where billions of dollars are spent each year in trying to
attempt to keep the drug situation under control.
CONCLUSION
The prosecution of criminals and the economics of criminal activity are
intimately related. In terms of piracy, the CGPCS established Working
Group 5 to focus on and coordinate efforts to disrupt the pirate enterprise
ashore, but so far, a report has not been issued. In order to improve the
economic conditions ashore, CPGCS has advocated the “Kampala Process,
a Somali counter-piracy dialogue forum which discusses, inter alia, how to
best strengthen the capacity to prosecute suspected pirates.”140One of the top
priorities listed by the CGPCS has been “to increase the number of
prosecutions,” as more than 1,000 pirates have been detained and
prosecuted in 20 jurisdictions across the world as of July 2011.141 The
authors’ conclusion is that none of the prosecutions will hold water if there
is so much money out that the judges and lawyers can be bought off. It is
hard to believe with the millions of dollars being spent by the UNODC and
other groups in Somalia, that something will not be done; however, the
authors are very pessimistic about the way things are going regarding
funding of the pirates given the amount of cash involved.
It does not help to see headlines indicating that the pirates have their own
stock exchange.142 Yes, that is sadly true. Apparently, “the world’s first
138. See infra App. B.
139. See Harper, supra note 119.
140. See Ninth Plenary Session, supra note 5, at 2. The “Somali Contact Group on
Counter-Piracy[,]”[] also called the Kampala Process, was established on the basis of a
request by Working Group 1 of the CGPCS at a technical meeting between the Transitional
Federal Government (TFG), Puntland and Somaliland in January 2010 with a view to
promote internal coordination, information-generation and sharing, and to coordinate their
respective counter-piracy offices. Since the initial meeting, Galmudug has joined the
Kampala Process. United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), in collaboration
with partners, provides secretariat functions, based in Hargeisa, to advance an integrated law
reform strategy for Somalia. Kampala Process, OCEANS BEYOND PIRACY,
http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/matrix/activity/kampala-process (last visited Mar. 9, 2012).
141. CGPCS, Ninth Plenary Session, supra note 5, at 2.
142. Avi Jorisch, Opinion, Today’s Pirates Have Their Own Stock Exchange, WALL
ST. J., June 16, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304520804576341
223910765818.html.
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pira[cy] stock exchange was established in 2009 in Harardheere, [which is
located about] 250 miles northeast of Mogadishu, Somalia.”143 It is open 24
hours a day and it allows investors to profit from ransoms collected on the
high seas which can approach $10 million for successful attacks against
Western commercial vessels.144 There are over 70 entities listed on this
exchange, which provide Somali pirates with access to capital and pay
investors a share of the profits. 145 A former pirate stated to Reuters that
“‘[t]he shares are open to all and everybody can take part, whether
personally at sea or on land by providing cash, weapons or useful materials.
. . . We’ve made piracy a community activity.’”146
CGPCS has stressed the international community’s anger at the ongoing
suffering of kidnapped innocent seafarers, and their Tenth Plenary Session
noted the important deterrent role of military Vessel Protection
Detachments (VPDs) in preventing vessels from being pirated.147 Though
international navies have substantially increased the difficulty in hijacking
ships, investors have been forced to place more resources into maximizing
the return from each captured ship.148 The increasing amount of financial
investments from both the piracy benefactor and international community
has caused maritime piracy to evolve into an environment where both
pirates and navies are more violent than ever before.149 Navies are
struggling to cope with the increasing surge of pirate attacks; while piracy
itself has become “an expanding phenomenon[,]” both in terms of the level
of activity and range.”150 It is hoped that the international community will be
able to get all of this under control at some point. At present, there needs to
be coordination between the results shown regarding the economics and
financing of sea piracy with 1) the prosecution of pirates and 2) the
organizers and backers of the various financial institutions that are involved
with this enterprise. U.N. has issued numerous reports, which emphasize
that in order for any viable success to be shown piracy has to be solved
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. To date, there are four banks in Somalia indicated to be involved with the
stock exchange, all of which are probably wholly owned by the government of Somalia as
well as an independent bank known as the Universal Bank of Somalia. In order to prevent
U.S. citizens from engaging with this stock exchange, the U.S. Treasury Department, it is
suggested, could mandate a standard of care by issuing guidance to American financial
institutions making certain that they are not doing business for this exchange or any other
piracy exchange that is set up. Id.
147. CGPCS, Tenth Plenary Session, supra note 5, at 2.
148. Shorthand, supra note 126, at 2.
149. Violence begets violence and pirates today are not only more organized but also
more willing to kill than ever before. See, e.g., Edward H. Lundquist, Pirates are Becoming
More Violent (May 15, 2011), http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/pirates-arebecoming-more-violent/.
150. See, e.g., Nick Childs, Navies Struggle with ‘Swarming’ Pirates, BBC NEWS
(Apr. 1, 2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8598726.stm.

770

Michigan State International Law Review

[Vol. 20:3

within the gates of Somalia.151 The economics of piracy, however, is
beginning to show that if piracy is not solved within Somalia’s borders soon
then piracy may replicate the South American drugs trade in the 1970s—a
relatively small-time operation which turned into a huge global crisis.

151. See, e.g., U.N. S.C. Rep. of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2010/394 (July
26, 2010).
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APPENDIX A
Andrew Mwangura’s E-mail Request:
1. ·A complete list of all ships and hostages currently being held. The
number of ships and hostages (along with date and location taken)
·Asking Price, Current location and whether the ships are being
used as mother ships
2. ·A complete list of all successful ransoms.
·Name, flag, country of ownership, number of crew
·Initial asking price for each ship
·Eventual ransom paid
·Time held in captivity before release
3. ·A complete list of all pirate groups and financiers, including the
locations they work out of.
·A list of all pirate groups and their names, and an estimate of the
number of pirates.
Comparison to the number of groups over the same period last
year, and the number of pirates.
4. ·A complete list of hostages who died in this period, and how they
were killed.
5. ·An accurate figure of the number of attacks over the period
mentioned above.
Included in this should be a month-by-month breakdown of
Number of attacks vs. success rate.
6. A detailed look at the following trends:
·Increase in violence against hostages.
·How much has this increased?
·Why is this changing?
·The use of VPDs
·How many vessels have VPDs today compared to one year ago
(estimate of actual number and percentage of merchant shipping in
piracy danger zone)?
·How does this correlate to the number of successful attacks?
·What is the general feeling in the shipping industry?
·Will VPDs help quell the problem or cause more violence?
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·Are there still concerns over rogue companies setting themselves
up and providing poor security?
·Change in pirate tactics
·How have pirate tactics changed?
·Are they using more force?
·Do they have better weapons?
·Are they ranging even further out to sea?
·Are they now targeting governments for ransoms more, and
why?
·Are they keeping more sailors on land, and why (numbers,
please)?
·Are they using the media more to push negotiations (examples
and evidence, please)?
7. Community opposition to piracy
·How much has this grown? How has this force the pirates to
move?
·What were the old hotspots and what are the new hotspots?
·Anti-piracy initiatives
·What new initiatives are we seeing, for example land-based programs?
·How has the focus changed, if at all?
Prosecutions and deaths
·How many pirates have been captured over the last year?
·How many have been prosecuted over how many had to be released?
·How many pirates have been killed?
·How does these figures compare to the previous year?
·Have prosecutions had any effect?
Ransom payments
·Was the seizure of the ransom in Mogadishu a one-off, or could
ransom payments be targeted in the future?
Navies
·How many attacks have the navies disrupted?
·How does this compare to the previous year?
·Has this had any effect on the number of successful attacks?
·Have they changed their tactics (for example, when they formed a
barrier close to the Somali coast and targeted pirate vessels)?
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Costs
·How much has this cost the shipping industry over the last year?
·How does this compare to the previous one-year period?
Pirates and al-Shabaab
·Are there any links between the pirates and al-Shabaab? We need
evidence (names, dates and payments made, and where they were
paid).
APPENDIX B 152

152. Jo Becker, Beirut Bank Seen as a Hub of Hezbollah’s Financing, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 13, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/12/13/world/middleeast/lebanesemoney-laundering.html.

